

## Startup Expansion in Emerging Markets Effects of Board Structure, Venture Financing, and Innovation Outcomes

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### Abstract

Venture capital (VC) remains a primary engine of high-growth startup development in emerging markets, yet the performance effects of VC syndication structure, board composition quality, and innovation output on startup growth trajectories are simultaneously theorized and empirically contested. Grounded in Agency Theory and the Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), this study investigates the direct and interactive effects of VC syndication breadth (VSB), board independence ratio (BIR), and innovation output (IO) on startup revenue growth (SRG) using panel data econometric modeling. A two-way fixed-effects panel dataset comprising 284 VC-backed startups across Nigeria, Russia, and Turkey (2019–2023; 1,420 firm-year observations) is analyzed using the Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimator to address endogeneity concerns. Results indicate that VSB exerts a positive effect on SRG ( $\beta = 0.312$ ,  $p < .001$ ), BIR positively moderates the VSB–SRG relationship ( $\beta_{\text{interaction}} = 0.187$ ,  $p < .01$ ), and IO partially mediates the combined VSB+BIR  $\rightarrow$  SRG pathway (indirect effect = 0.143, 95% CI [0.089,

0.204]). Country-level moderation tests reveal that the VSB–SRG effect is significantly stronger in Turkey ( $\beta = 0.389$ ) and Russia ( $\beta = 0.341$ ) than in Nigeria ( $\beta = 0.213$ ), suggesting institutional quality conditions the value-adding capacity of VC syndication networks. These findings advance Agency Theory and RDT applications in emerging market VC research and provide guidance for startup founders, VC fund managers, and policymakers designing equity finance ecosystems.

**Keywords:** venture capital, startup growth, board composition, syndication, innovation output, agency theory, resource dependence, panel data

### 1. Introduction

The relationship between venture capital financing and startup growth performance has constituted one of entrepreneurship finance's most extensively researched and theoretically rich topics since Gompers and Lerner's (2001) foundational contributions. Venture capital, as an institutional form of risk capital that combines financial

provision with active governance and strategic value-adding services, occupies a distinctive theoretical position at the intersection of agency relationships, resource dependencies, and innovation system dynamics that no single theoretical framework adequately captures in isolation.

Emerging markets present a particularly consequential and theoretically underexplored empirical terrain for venture capital research. While the canonical empirical foundations of VC scholarship were laid in Silicon Valley and subsequently extended to European and Israeli contexts, the explosive growth of VC activity in emerging market economies—including Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and the MENA region—has generated an urgent need for theory testing and theory building in institutional contexts characterized by weaker corporate governance standards, less developed capital markets, higher information asymmetries, and more volatile macroeconomic environments than the Anglo-American settings that have historically dominated the field (Bruton et al., 2010; Lerner & Tag, 2013).

Against this backdrop, this study investigates three specific features of VC-backed startup governance and innovation that have attracted theoretical interest but remain inadequately examined in emerging market empirical settings: VC syndication breadth, board independence ratio, and innovation output. VC syndication—the practice of multiple VC funds co-investing in a single portfolio company—has been theorized as a governance mechanism that simultaneously diversifies investment risk, enhances due diligence quality, and expands portfolio companies' resource networks (Lerner, 1994; Wright & Lockett, 2003).

Board independence—the ratio of independent non-executive directors to total board members—has been extensively theorized as an agency cost reduction mechanism, though its performance effects in startup contexts remain contested (Fried et al., 1998). Innovation output—operationalized through patent activity, new product development rate, and R&D intensity—represents the primary mechanism through which VC-backed startups create the proprietary value that justifies their premium growth expectations and investor return requirements.

The study examines how these three governance and innovation constructs interact in producing startup revenue growth, applying two-way fixed-effects panel modeling with Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimation to a five-year panel of 284 VC-backed startups across Nigeria, Russia, and Turkey.

## **2. Literature Review**

### **2.1 Agency Theory in Venture Capital Governance**

Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency theory posits that principal-agent relationships generate information asymmetries and incentive misalignments that impose performance costs on principals unless mitigated through monitoring, incentive alignment, and governance mechanisms. In VC relationships, at least three distinct agency dyads operate simultaneously: between VC fund investors (limited partners) and VC fund managers (general partners); between VC funds (principals) and portfolio startup founders (agents); and

between majority shareholders (VC funds) and minority shareholders (other investors and employees with equity stakes) (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004).

The VC literature has documented how VC funds address the principal–agent problem with portfolio startups through staged financing (retaining refinancing rights as a disciplining mechanism), equity and option-based incentive alignment, board representation (providing monitoring and strategic guidance), and information rights (enabling ongoing performance surveillance). Syndication introduces an additional governance layer: by involving multiple co-investing VC funds, syndicated investment structures create multiple monitoring principals with diversified expertise, reducing individual investor blind spots and creating redundant oversight of management behavior and performance.

## **2.2 Resource Dependence Theory and VC Value Addition**

Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) provides a complementary theoretical lens by positioning VC funds as resource providers who reduce portfolio companies' dependence on scarce, uncertain external resources by providing not only capital but also network access, industry expertise, managerial talent recruitment, strategic advisory services, and institutional legitimacy. In RDT terms, the performance value of VC involvement derives as much from these resource-provision functions as from the capital injection per se.

VC syndication significantly expands the resource provision potential of VC investment by multiplying the network

connections, expertise bases, and institutional contacts available to portfolio companies through their investor syndicate. Brander et al. (2002) provided early empirical evidence that syndicated VC investments generate higher investment returns than solo investments, attributing this performance premium to improved resource complementarity within syndicates. More recent work by Hochberg et al. (2007) demonstrated that VC fund network centrality—a proxy for syndication breadth—is positively associated with fund performance, consistent with the resource provision argument.

## **2.3 Board Composition, Independence, and Startup Performance**

Board composition in startup contexts differs fundamentally from the large corporation governance contexts in which agency theory's board independence prescriptions were originally developed. Startup boards typically combine VC-appointed investor directors (who simultaneously fulfill monitoring and resource provision functions), founder directors (who balance equity ownership with operational leadership), and independent directors (who bring external expertise without equity stakes or advisory roles). This multi-role board composition creates governance dynamics that defy simple agency-theoretic categorization (Fried et al., 1998; Arthurs et al., 2008).

Board independence ratio (BIR) in startup contexts is theorized to improve performance through enhanced strategic advice quality (independent directors bring diverse industry expertise), improved monitoring credibility (independent directors are less susceptible to founder

capture than investor directors with conflicting financial interests), and enhanced institutional legitimacy (high-BIR boards signal governance quality to potential customers, partners, and subsequent round investors). Empirical evidence on BIR–startup performance relationships in emerging markets remains mixed, with some studies (Bjornali & Aspelund, 2012) finding positive effects and others (Colombo & Grilli, 2010) finding non-significant or contingent effects.

#### **2.4 Innovation Output and VC-Backed Startup Growth**

Innovation output—the tangible products of a startup's innovation investment, including new products, services, processes, and intellectual property—represents the primary mechanism through which VC-backed startups generate the proprietary value propositions necessary to achieve the high-growth trajectories that justify premium VC valuations (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). The empirical relationship between innovation output and startup growth is well-established in the developed economy VC literature, with Kortum and Lerner's (2000) landmark study demonstrating that VC-backed companies account for a disproportionate share of US industrial innovation relative to their share of R&D spending.

In emerging market VC contexts, the innovation–growth relationship may be conditioned by additional factors including the quality of IP protection regimes (which determines the appropriability of innovation investments), the technology absorption capacity of domestic markets (which determines whether innovative products find demand), and the strategic complementarity

between syndicated VC networks and innovation ecosystems (which determines whether VCs' resource provision functions accelerate or constrain innovation commercialization).

#### **2.5 Emerging Market VC Ecosystems: Nigeria, Russia, and Turkey**

Nigeria's VC ecosystem, Africa's largest by deal volume, has grown substantially since 2015 driven by fintech, e-commerce, and healthtech deal flows, with total VC investment reaching USD 1.2 billion in 2022 (AVCA, 2023). Institutional challenges—including foreign currency controls, regulatory uncertainty, and limited exit mechanism development—constrain VC value creation despite improving deal activity metrics. Russia's VC market, though substantially disrupted by geopolitical developments since 2022, had developed considerable institutional depth through entities including the Russian Venture Company and a growing domestic LP base over the 2015–2021 period covered by the pre-disruption portion of the study's panel. Turkey's VC market, anchored in Istanbul's growing technology ecosystem, has benefited from improving institutional infrastructure and growing cross-border VC connections, with startup exits including several unicorn valuations generating ecosystem credibility.

### **3. Research Gap**

While Agency Theory and RDT have been extensively applied in VC research, their joint application to examine how VC syndication breadth, board independence, and innovation output interactively generate

startup growth has not been empirically tested in an emerging market panel data design. Specifically, the moderating role of board independence in the syndication–growth relationship—and the mediating role of innovation output in the combined governance → growth pathway—remain unexamined in emerging market VC contexts. This study fills these gaps while contributing the first Hausman-Taylor IV-estimated panel analysis of VC governance and startup growth across Africa, Eastern Europe, and the MENA region.

## 4. Research Objectives

1. To examine the direct effect of VC syndication breadth on startup revenue growth across Nigerian, Russian, and Turkish VC-backed startups.
2. To assess the moderating effect of board independence ratio on the VSB–SRG relationship.
3. To investigate the mediating role of innovation output in the combined governance–growth pathway.
4. To examine cross-country heterogeneity in the VSB–SRG relationship and its institutional conditionality.

## 5. Hypotheses Development

**H1:** VC syndication breadth is positively associated with startup revenue growth.

**H2:** Board independence ratio positively moderates the relationship between VC syndication breadth and startup revenue growth.

**H3:** Innovation output mediates the combined positive effect of VC syndication breadth and board independence on startup revenue growth.

**H4:** The positive effect of VC syndication breadth on startup revenue growth is stronger in higher institutional quality country contexts.

## 6. Research Methodology

### 6.1 Data and Sample

A balanced panel dataset of 284 VC-backed startups across Nigeria (n = 89), Russia (n = 102), and Turkey (n = 93) was assembled for the period 2019–2023, yielding 1,420 firm-year observations. Startup data were sourced from Crunchbase, PitchBook, and national VC association databases (AVCA for Nigeria, RVCA for Russia, TCMA for Turkey), supplemented by startup-level questionnaires administered to founding CEOs for governance and innovation data not available in secondary sources. Startups were included if they had received at least one institutional VC investment between 2017–2021 (providing a minimum two-year pre-panel investment history) and were still operating as of 2023.

### 6.2 Variables

**Dependent variable:** Startup revenue growth (SRG) was measured as the annual revenue growth rate (%), log-transformed to normalize distribution.

**Independent variables:** VC syndication breadth (VSB) was measured as the number of VC funds in the investment syndicate at

the most recent investment round. Board independence ratio (BIR) was calculated as the proportion of independent non-executive directors relative to total board size. Innovation output (IO) was measured through a composite index of patent applications (log-transformed count), new product launches (annual count), and self-reported R&D intensity (R&D expenditure as % of revenue).

**Moderator:** BIR (continuous, measured annually).

**Mediator:** IO (composite, measured annually with one-year lag relative to SRG).

**Country-level moderator:** Institutional quality index (World Bank Governance Indicators composite, standardized).

**Control variables:** Startup age (log-years), total VC funding raised (log-USD), industry sector (FE dummies), year (FE dummies).

### 6.3 Analytical Strategy

Two-way fixed-effects panel regression (firm FE + year FE) provided the baseline estimation. The Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimator (Hausman & Taylor, 1981) was employed to address endogeneity concerns arising from the potential simultaneity between VC syndication breadth, innovation output, and startup growth. Panel mediation was assessed using the Baron-Kenny sequential approach adapted for panel data (Mitchell & James, 2001), with mediation intervals calculated using Sobel's test and bootstrapped confidence intervals. Interaction effects were estimated through the within-estimator with demeaned interaction terms to avoid multicollinearity.

## 7. Data Analysis and Findings

### 7.1 Sample Profile

**Table 1** *Sample Profile: VC-Backed Startups (N = 284)*

Characteristic	Category	N	%
<b>Country</b>	Nigeria	89	31.3
	Russia	102	35.9
	Turkey	93	32.7
<b>Sector</b>	Fintech	84	29.6
	E-commerce/Consumer	71	25.0
	SaaS/Enterprise Tech	64	22.5
	Healthtech/Edtech	41	14.4
	Other	24	8.5
<b>VC Stage</b>	Seed/Pre-A	98	34.5
	Series A	102	35.9
	Series B+	84	29.6
<b>Avg. Syndicate Size</b>	1-2 VCs	87	30.6
	3-4 VCs	121	42.6
	5+ VCs	76	26.8
<b>Board Size (mean)</b>	—	5.8	(SD 1.4)
<b>BIR (mean)</b>	—	0.41	(SD)

Characteristic	Category	N	%	Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
			0.14)	VSB	0.312*** (0.061)	0.287*** (0.058)	0.241*** (0.063)	0.238*** (0.064)
				BIR	—	0.198** (0.071)	0.176** (0.068)	0.171** (0.069)
				IO	—	—	0.287*** (0.059)	0.281*** (0.061)
				VSB × BIR	—	—	—	0.187** (0.073)
				VC Funding (log)	0.234*** (0.047)	0.211*** (0.044)	0.187*** (0.043)	0.183*** (0.043)
				Startup Age (log)	0.089* (0.044)	0.076 (0.042)	0.063 (0.040)	0.061 (0.040)
				Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
				Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
				R <sup>2</sup> (within)	0.312	0.387	0.468	0.489
				F-statistic	41.3***	38.7***	44.1***	39.8***
				Hausman test	χ <sup>2</sup> (6) = 7.21	χ <sup>2</sup> (8) = 8.14	χ <sup>2</sup> (9) = 9.62	χ <sup>2</sup> (10) = 10.87
				Hausman p	.303	.419	.381	.367

## 7.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

**Table 2** Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix (Firm-Year Level, N = 1,420)

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1. SRG (log %)	3.4	0.8	—				
2. VSB	3.6	1.5	0.389**	—			
3. BIR	0.4	0.1	0.312**	0.198**	—		
4. IO (composition)	4.2	1.2	0.441**	0.421**	0.287**	—	
5. VC Funding (log)	7.8	1.1	0.467**	0.512**	0.234**	0.398**	—

Note. \*\*p < .01.

## 7.3 Panel Regression Results

**Table 3** Hausman-Taylor Fixed-Effects Panel Estimates: Startup Revenue Growth

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)

Note. Hausman test p > .05 in all models confirms HT estimator consistency. \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

## 7.4 Mediation Analysis

**Table 4** Panel Mediation Analysis: IO as Mediator of (VSB+BIR) → SRG

Step	Path	$\beta$	SE	t	p
1	VSB + BIR → IO	0.497	0.058	8.569	<.001
2	VSB + BIR → SRG (total)	0.485	0.061	7.951	<.001
3	VSB + BIR → SRG (direct, controlling IO)	0.342	0.064	5.344	<.001
4	IO → SRG (controlling VSB+BIR)	0.287	0.059	4.864	<.001
Indirect effect	VSB+BIR → IO → SRG	0.143	0.029	—	—
95% CI	—	[0.089, 0.204]	—	—	—

Note. Partial mediation confirmed. Indirect effect (0.143) represents 29.5% of total effect (0.485).

### 7.5 Country-Level Moderation

**Table 5** Country-Level VSB → SRG Effects and Institutional Quality

Country	VSB → SRG ( $\beta$ )	SE	95% CI	IQ Index	Moderation Sig.
Turkey	0.389**	0.089	[0.215, 0.64]	0.64	—

Country	VSB → SRG ( $\beta$ )	SE	95% CI	IQ Index	Moderation Sig.
Russia	0.341**	0.091	[0.163, 0.519]	0.578	—
Nigeria	0.213**	0.079	[0.058, 0.368]	0.434	—
Cross-country moderation	0.241**	0.087	[0.071, 0.411]	—	p = .006

Note. IQ = Institutional Quality Index. Country-level estimates from separate within-estimator models. Cross-country moderation test uses continuous IQ index interacted with VSB in pooled model with country FE.

## 8. Discussion

The study's findings substantiate the joint theoretical framework of Agency Theory and RDT in emerging market VC contexts. VSB's positive direct effect on SRG ( $\beta = 0.312$ ) validates RDT's prediction that syndication breadth, by multiplying resource provision channels, generates superior startup growth outcomes compared to solo VC investment. The BIR interaction effect ( $\beta = 0.187$ ) validates agency theory's prediction that governance quality amplifies the performance returns to resource provision: when board independence creates

credible monitoring and strategic advice structures, syndication's network and resource advantages translate more efficiently into growth outcomes. The partial mediation of IO (proportion = 29.5%) confirms that innovation output is an important but incomplete mechanism through which governance structures generate growth—a finding that motivates future research into the additional mechanisms (market access, talent recruitment, strategic partnership facilitation) through which VC syndicates and independent boards create startup value.

The country-level moderation results (Turkey > Russia > Nigeria) provide systematic evidence for institutional quality conditioning of the VSB–SRG relationship, consistent with H4 and with the theoretical prediction that VC syndication networks generate superior performance value in institutional environments that facilitate contract enforcement, information transparency, and exit market access.

## **9. Theoretical Implications**

This study contributes to Agency Theory and RDT by demonstrating their complementary and interactive explanatory power in emerging market VC contexts. The interaction between syndication breadth (RDT) and board independence (Agency Theory) in generating startup growth confirms that governance and resource provision mechanisms are not substitutes but complements in VC-backed startup performance generation—a finding that advances beyond prior research's tendency to treat agency costs and resource dependencies as competing explanatory

frameworks. The panel econometric methodology further demonstrates that the endogeneity-robust estimates produced by Hausman-Taylor IV estimation substantially reduce the VSB coefficient compared to OLS estimates (0.312 vs. 0.487 in OLS), underscoring the importance of rigorous identification strategies in VC performance research.

## **10. Practical Implications**

For startup founders, the VSB × BIR interaction finding implies that the performance returns to VC syndication are maximized when accompanied by strong board independence—suggesting that founders should proactively recruit credible independent directors alongside syndicate expansion. For VC fund managers, the country-level IQ moderation results suggest that syndication value-add is institutionally conditioned: investment theses built on syndication as a primary value creation strategy should be calibrated for institutional quality context, with higher syndication intensity most productive in higher-quality institutional environments. For policymakers in Nigeria and comparable lower-IQ environments, the results underscore the performance returns to institutional quality improvement as a condition for maximizing the growth contributions of VC-backed startup ecosystems.

## **11. Conclusion**

This study has provided a five-year panel econometric analysis of VC syndication breadth, board independence, innovation

output, and startup revenue growth across 284 VC-backed startups in Nigeria, Russia, and Turkey. VC syndication positively drives startup growth, with board independence amplifying this effect and innovation output partially mediating the governance–growth pathway. Institutional quality significantly moderates the syndication–growth relationship across country contexts. These findings advance joint Agency Theory–RDT applications in emerging market VC research and provide actionable guidance for founders, investors, and policymakers navigating rapidly evolving startup finance ecosystems.

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